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Abstract. This article presents R.S. Peters’ theory of moral education embedded in his 
broad conception of morality. The author examines Peters’ views against the background 
of Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development; hence, the positions of both thinkers 
are interwoven throughout the discussion. It addresses some central issues relevant to 
moral education such as, for example: cognitive and affective aspects of morality, and 
the acquisition of virtues. In the article the author argues that Peters’ account of moral 
development and moral education provides supplementation for the somewhat narrow 
theory developed by Kohlberg, thus establishing a broader framework relevant to moral 
education. 
1. introduction
R.S. Peters is best known for his work on the analysis and the justification of 
education. But he also had a deep interest in a third, fundamental question that 
any serious philosophy of education should try to address: How do we adequate-
ly conceive of moral development and moral education?
Peters elaborates his approach to moral education in a critical dialectic with 
Laurence Kohlberg’s cognitive theory of moral development. He accepts Kohlberg’s 
view that the ultimate goal of moral education is the acquisition of a rational, 
principled morality, be it in a suitably supplemented form. In this paper, I show 
how Peters supplements Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental psychology in order 
to construct a comprehensive theory of moral education that covers the form as 
well as the content of morality. Because ‘… a determinate notion of “morality” 
is an essential precondition for any serious approach to moral education’ (Peters, 
1974a, p. 541), I start with an outline of Peters’ moral view.
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2. the form and content of morality
To do justice to the phenomenological complexity of moral life Peters ope- 
rates with a very broad conception of morality. Phenomenologically astute, Peters 
(1970, pp. 69-70; 1973, pp. 16-17) distinguishes between five aspects of our 
moral life. In describing them he uses different vocabularies in different contexts. 
Sometimes he uses the vocabulary of principles, rules and duties, at other times 
that of character-traits or virtues (and vices) and motives. Given that character- 
traits and motives are internalized or personalized principles and rules, there is 
no harm in using these vocabularies interchangeably.
There are, first, the principles and rules which govern the conduct between 
members of a  democratic society. Two types of virtues are important in this 
interpersonal realm. On the one hand, we have the highly specific virtues, such 
as honesty, punctuality, tidiness and politeness, on the other we have the more 
‘artificial’ virtues, such as justice, fairness, the impartial consideration of interests 
and respect for people. To this sphere of morality also belong basic rules, ‘e.g. 
concerning contracts, [non-injury,] property and the care of the young, which any 
rational man can see to be necessary to any continuing of social life, man being 
what he is and the conditions of life on earth being what they are’ (Peters, 1970, 
p. 65; also 1973, p. 13; 1974a, p. 546; 1978, p. 124).
There are, secondly, motives which personalize purposes, or even goals of life, 
that are based on appraisals of a situation. This facet of our moral life includes, 
among others, the virtues of benevolence, compassion and gratitude, the vices 
of ambition, envy and greed. These ‘natural’ virtues contain within themselves 
reasons for action, whereas the ‘artificial’ and highly specific virtues just mention- 
ed lack built-in reasons for action. The exercise of such action-related virtues 
typically arouse feelings and emotions. Motives and emotions are more at home 
in the sphere of personal relationships than in the public sphere of civic virtues.
There are, thirdly, qualities of the will ‘that are both content-free and which do 
not, like motives, introduce teleological considerations. … They are of a higher order 
and relate to the ways in which rules are followed or purposes pursued’ (Peters, 
1971, p. 247). To this element of our moral life pertain virtues such as determina-
tion, persistence, courage, consistency, integrity and autonomy. It is essential to 
these so-called virtues of ‘self-control’ that counter inclinations must be present 
when such virtues are exercised. One needs only to exercise self-control in a situa- 
tion when one threatens to be overcome by inclinations that go against one’s will.
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Peters casts his moral net very wide. Not only principles and rules, mo- 
tives and volitional qualities are morally relevant, but also, fourthly, worthwhile 
activities are included in the moral sphere. These ‘good’ or ‘desirable’ activities 
are deemed to be so valuable that children ought to be initiated into them. To 
this range of activities belong, among others, science, history, poetry and engi-
neering, and possibly also a variety of games and pastimes. These activities, on 
the basis of which individuals can make something of themselves if they freely 
engage in them, supply not only for their occupations and professional lives but 
also for their vocations and ideals of life.
Finally, there are particular role-responsibilities – a person’s station and its 
duties. These are specific obligations that go together with occupying a social role 
in society. Role-responsibilities involve what is socially required of a person as, for 
example, a husband, father, citizen, and member of an occupation or profession.
How does Peters combine this ethical pluralism with his emphasis on a classi-
cal principled morality? Such a principled morality gradually emerged in Western 
civilisation. It took a long time, until the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, before a  rational, universalistic type of morality became 
distinct from religion, law and customary codes of conduct. The hallmark of such 
a morality is its appeal to fundamental principles, which are presupposed in all 
practical reasoning in a democratic society, to adjudicate on particular codes and 
their conflicts.
To bring these two elements of his moral theory – pluralism and principlism 
– together Peters makes the important distinction between the form and the 
content of moral consciousness. He describes the structure of consciousness by 
making use of Michael Oakeshott’s ‘experience and its modes’ terminology (Oake-
shott, 1933). ‘Experience’ functions as a wide and generic term. It also includes 
knowledge and understanding, and it is further qualified in different specific 
‘modes’ of experience such as the historical, scientific, practical or moral. So, 
moral consciousness is in this terminology called ‘the moral mode of experience’.
The emergence of a principled morality in Western civilisation amounts then 
to the emergence of a rational form of the moral mode of experience. A principled 
morality is a universalistic type of morality constituted by fundamental principles 
that are presupposed in the exercise of practical reason. These higher-order prin-
ciples of a procedural kind – impartiality, the consideration of interests, freedom, 
respect for persons – supply a rational form for the moral mode of experience. 
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They provide a  form of thought that structures the more culture-bound and 
concrete content of the moral mode of experience. Henceforward, I abbreviate 
the phrase ‘the moral mode of experience’ just by the term ‘morality’.
Against the backdrop of this form-content distinction, Peters is able to di-
stinguish between the more procedural and the more substantive elements of 
morality: principles, basic rules and the qualities of will belong to the form of 
morality, whereas highly specific rules, worthwhile activities and the role-respon-
sibilities belong to morality’s content. Certain ‘universalistic’ motives, such as 
benevolence, also might be taken to concern the form of morality. So, Peters’ 
ethical pluralism can be rationally reconstructed by distinguishing between the 
form and the content of morality. Yet, although both moral form and content are 
integral parts of his moral theory, he is first and foremost interested in its form, 
or what he calls ‘rational morality’ (Peters, 1973, p. 15).
3. comprehensive moral education
With Peters’ pluralistic conception of morality and his emphasis on a rational 
morality in place, we can turn to his approach to moral development and moral 
education. Given that a  moral theory is an essential preliminary for such an 
approach, Peters’ ethical pluralism precludes any simple-minded or one-dimen-
sional view of moral education.
According to Peters (ibid., pp. 23; 46), the gradual emergence of a rational 
morality in Western history is paralleled by the gradual emergence of an autono-
mous stage in the moral development of children. The ‘ontogenetic’ emergence 
of such a stage parallels the ‘phylogenetic’ emergence of a principled morality in 
the West. Whatever one thinks about this sweeping hypothesis, the cognitive-
developmental psychology of Jean Piaget (1932) and Laurence Kohlberg (1981) 
is undeniably the point of reference from which Peters builds up his own view 
of moral education.1 He articulates his approach in a critical dialectic with this 
so-called ‘constructivist’ theory.
In line with his ethical pluralism Peters does not interpret social-learning 
theory (or behaviourism) and constructionism as competing theories between 
which an exclusive choice has to be made. Although Peters takes the constructivist 
1 For a general philosophical treatment of the Piaget-Kohlberg theory, see Flanagan, 1991, 
chap. 5.
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view as his point of reference, he repeatedly emphasizes that the Piaget-Kohlberg 
theory needs supplementation with other theories of moral education, among 
which even Skinnerian behaviourism. Moreover, the cognitive-developmental 
psychology is, according to Peters, too one-dimensional in its narrow focus on 
the cognitive aspect of moral education. It needs, therefore, to be supplemented 
by an account of the affective aspect of moral development.
So, the overall picture that comes to light is that Peters offers us, not another 
competing theory, but an original comprehensive theory of moral education that 
tries to do justice to the several facets of our moral life. I commence the explo-
ration of this comprehensive picture with a brief outline of Kohlberg’s cognitive-
developmental psychology.
4. Kohlberg’s stage theory
What is, according to Kohlberg, moral development? He takes over from 
Piaget, who adopts a  Kantian framework, the constructivist conception of 
intellectual and moral development. Constructivists claim that parallel to the 
biological development of the body there exists a psychological development of 
the mind through time. The mind is conceived as a system of mental structures 
(or schemata) that changes from infancy through childhood and adolescence to 
adulthood. The mind receives and operates on experiential input; it transforms 
the experiential input into behavioural output by making use of (hidden) mental 
structures. These structures are neither copied from the outside nor programmed 
by the inside, but constructed in the dialectical relation between the child and its 
environment. Mental structures change through time in an orderly pattern, which 
is conceptualized in terms of stage succession and progression. The mind deve-
lops intellectually as well as morally through such temporally and hierarchically 
ordered stages.
From his experimental research, Kohlberg identified a sequence of six stages 
of moral development proceeding through three levels:
A. Preconventional or Egocentric;
B. Conventional or Heteronomous; and
C. Postconventional (Principled) or Autonomous.
He claims this sequence to be invariant and universal, that is to say, all 
(biologically normal) children go through all the stages successively without 
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stage-skipping and all the stages are found in all cultures. This claim is not implau-
sible because Kohlberg explicitly makes the distinction between the form and the 
content of moral development, and the cultural invariant claim only pertains to 
the form (or structure) of moral development. Although there can be considerable 
differences between cultures as to the content of moral rules, the development of 
their form is culturally invariant. Obviously, Kohlberg’s form-content distinction as 
to moral development mirrors that of Peters as to moral life. It is precisely because 
Kohlberg’s stage theory is so greatly significant for the development of a rational 
or principled morality in childhood that this theory functions as the point of 
reference in Peters’ approach to moral education. Kohlberg is not interested in 
the teaching and learning of variable moral codes or specific moral rules, which 
he derides as ‘a bag of virtues’ approach. They are context-dependent and instable 
character-traits, whereas fundamental principles, especially the principle of just- 
ice, which constitute a rational morality, are stable and cross-culturally uniform.
Kohlberg’s stage theory as a theory about the development of a rational mo-
rality in childhood is, therefore, a theory about the development of children’s way 
of grasping principles. Corresponding to the changes children’s form of thought 
concerning rules undergo, their moral judgement at each stage has a  specific 
character. Children, Kohlberg claims,
start by seeing rules as dependent upon power and external compulsion; they then see 
them as instrumental to rewards and to the satisfaction of their needs [in the egocentric 
stage]; then as ways of obtaining social approval and esteem; then as upholding some 
ideal order [in the heteronomous stage]; and finally as articulations of social principles 
necessary to living together with others – especially justice [in the autonomous stage]. 
(Peters, 1971, pp. 238-39)
The way in which rules can be conceived is analogous to the style in which 
beliefs can be held. One can, for example, ‘egocentrically’ believe in the existence 
of God because it fulfils one’s need for comfort. But one can also ‘heterogene-
ously’ hold this belief on the authority of a priest, whom one trusts. Alternatively, 
one can ‘autonomously’ believe in God’s existence on the basis of rational proofs 
for the existence of God. In the case of empirical beliefs one can justifiably hold 
them on sufficiently supporting evidence. This rational style of believing is com-
parable to the critically reflective way in which one conceives rules and principles 
in the autonomous stage.
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5. Peters’ supplementation of Kohlberg
According to Kohlberg, the culturally invariant sequence in levels of concei- 
ving moral rules – from egocentric through heteronomous to autonomous – is 
constitutive of moral development (Peters, 1973, p. 24). The process of moral 
development involves, however, according to Peters, more than Kohlberg’s cogni-
tive-developmental psychology covers. An adequate theory of moral development 
and moral education needs to cover not only the form but also the content of 
morality. Moreover, Kohlberg’s restriction of the form of morality to the cognitive 
aspect is too limited. Against the background of his ethical pluralism, Peters 
supplements Kohlberg’s stage theory with three fundamental elements, which 
are, in addition, constitutive of moral development and/or moral education.
First, against Kohlberg’s dismissive attitude towards instilling ‘a bag of virtues’, 
Peters argues for the central importance of the content of morality in moral 
teaching. As a corollary, he defends the view that not only reason but also habit is 
crucial in moral education. Secondly, the development of moral competence es-
sentially comprises an affective aspect in addition to a cognitive aspect. Besides 
reason we also need compassion in educated people, and even reason cannot 
function on its own without rational passions. Thirdly, and this is an important 
preliminary point, Kohlberg’s very narrow conception of teaching (conceived 
primarily as direct instruction) should be supplanted by a  more broad one to 
make plausible the claim that moral development essentially involves some pro-
cess of teaching. I elaborate upon these supplementations in the reverse order.
6. can virtue be taught?
Kohlberg’s answer to this Socratic classical question is, surprisingly at first 
sight for a constructivist, negative. If moral development is constituted by the 
development of a rational form of morality through stages, then the transitions 
between the stages cannot be an effect of teaching. Concrete content can be 
learned by instruction and other explicit teaching methods, as well as by example- 
imitation or identification. Yet, changes in the way in which rules are conceived 
do not depend upon teaching, but upon the interaction between the child and its 
social environment, aided by what Kohlberg calls ‘cognitive stimulation’. Moral 
stage progression is neither the product of socialization nor of maturation, but 
the effect of the child’s experience of moral conflicts and active thought about 
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moral dilemmas (e.g. the famous ‘Heinz dilemma’) motivated by the desire to take 
the most ‘reversible’ or universal perspective. Although the child itself has the 
experiences and has to actively think for itself, the social environment can stimu-
late such experience and active thought. Parents, teachers and other educators 
can confront the child with problematic moral situations and provide feed-back 
that confirms or disconfirms its current moral problem-solving. So, virtue can be 
cognitively stimulated, but not taught. In this sense, Kohlberg’s stage theory is 
only a theory about moral development and not about moral education at all.
However, in opposing cognitive stimulation so starkly to teaching, Kohlberg 
runs the risk of diminishing the contributory cause of the educational environ-
ment in moral development to almost zero. As Peters (1974a, p. 548) critically 
observes: ‘But in contrasting the interaction with the environment, which stimu-
lates the development of a rational form of morality [cognitive stimulation], with 
“teaching”, which he thinks is singularly ineffective in this sphere, he makes it 
look too much as if the child, as it were, does it himself.’ Cognitive stimulation 
only seems to trigger the stage transitions but does add neither content nor form 
to the child’s internally developing moral competence. If external influences do 
not, or only minimally contribute to moral development, then the rational form 
of morality is not co-constructed in the child-environment interaction but self- 
constructed by the child alone. Kohlberg’s stage theory is, as a consequence, in 
danger of collapsing into a kind of maturation theory, either biological nativism or 
a somewhat mysterious Rousseauian (or Deweyean) type of self-discovery theory.
Since constructivism subscribes to the contributory causal impact of the 
social environment, it has to defend the claim that moral development involves 
partially but essentially some process of teaching. That is the reason why Peters 
corrects Kohlberg’s sharp contrast between cognitive stimulation and teaching 
by making a crucial distinction between teaching in the restricted and teaching 
in the unrestricted sense (Peters, 1971, pp. 243-45; 1973, pp. 37-38). In making 
his contrast, Kohlberg unduly restricts the concept of teaching to the specific 
notion of teaching as direct instruction. So restricted, the concept of teaching 
has indeed no application in the case of learning to grasp (moral) principles and 
to conceive of (moral) rules in an adequate way. Explicit instruction is appropriate 
in cases of information transfer and training skills but not in the case of learning 
principles, rules and the adequate attitudes towards them.2 Learning a principle 
2 Here I  skip over the ambiguity between learning principles and learning the adequate 
attitudes towards them. Peters writes: ‘If one takes … the forms of conception that are features 
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does not come down to learning an explicit content. Although the teacher has to 
exhibit a number of concrete items to the learner, the unifying principle under 
which these items are organized is itself not a further item for direct instruction. 
In bringing a child to an adequate grasp of a principle, all the teacher can do is 
present instances and draw attention to their common features until hopefully, 
‘the penny drops’ – until, that is, the learner catches on to the principle that is 
being instantiated. Therefore, on Kohlberg’s restricted notion of specific teaching, 
(moral) principles cannot be taught.
However, the unrestricted or ‘normal’ concept of teaching is also applicable in 
the case of learning principles and rules. In accordance with this concept, central 
cases of teaching activities have to fulfil three necessary conditions:
(i) they must be conducted with the intention of bringing about learning,
(ii) they must indicate or exhibit what is to be learnt,
(iii) they must do this in a way which is intelligible to, and within the capacities 
of, the learners. (Peters and Hirst, 1970, p. 81)
Even if Socrates was not explicitly telling Meno’s slave that the resultant 
square is twice the size of the original square, he taught him this ratio all the 
same by appropriate exemplifications and questions. Teaching methods depend 
upon the nature of what has to be learnt. Direct instruction is suitable in the 
case of the acquisition of information and skills, whereas indirect indication is 
suitable in the case of learning principles, as it is in the case of, for example, 
learning the grammatical rules of a language. In the latter case, a principle or rule 
is indicated by way of presenting several of its concrete instances. Even if one 
did not accept such an indirect case as a central case of teaching, it still would be 
a case of teaching in the derivative sense, because ‘[i]t is … possible that there 
are cases of “teaching” that disregard any one or even two of these [necessary] 
conditions, and yet are understood derivatively as cases of “teaching”’ (Peters 
and Hirst, 1970, p. 81). So, given the unrestricted concept of teaching, Kohlberg’s 
method of cognitive stimulation is a bona fide teaching method, and in accord 
of the different developmental stages, it is not obvious what can be done about these – for 
example, coming to see a rule as connected with approval rather than with rewards.’ (Peters, 
1971, p. 244). This is actually not about two types of principles, but about the difference between 
a principle itself and a cognitive attitude towards a principle. See also Peters, 1978, p. 117.
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with this concept there is no problem for a constructivist to claim that teaching 
essentially contributes to moral development.3
7. the passions
Kohlberg’s stage theory is exclusively a  theory about the development 
of children’s form of thought concerning the principles of a  rational morality, 
especially the principle of justice. However, besides the development of this 
cognitive aspect there is, according to Peters, the equally important development 
of the affective aspect, about which Kohlberg’s cognitivism is silent. The for-
mal principle of justice – no distinctions or exceptions should be made without 
relevant differences or grounds – will readily lead to the more material principle 
of the impartial consideration of people’s interests, but not in and of itself to 
caring about the interests of others. Concern for others in Kohlberg’s cognitive-
developmental psychology only functions as a rational principle, but is not based 
on feeling concern for them.
Yet, although young children are not capable of adequately grasping such 
a principle, empirically speaking they seem capable of such a sentiment, perhaps 
deriving from innate sympathy, very early on (Peters, 1973, p. 42). As a matter 
of fact, empathically caring about others appears to come much earlier in child 
development than grasping other-directed principles. Parallel to the develop- 
ment of children’s form of thought concerning the principles of a  rational 
morality apparently runs the development of their form of feeling concerning 
such principles, from a particularistic through to a more universalistic sentiment 
to what David Hume (1777) called, ‘the sentiment for humanity’. In line with his 
proposal to include certain universalistic motives, such as benevolence, in the 
form of morality as well, Peters argues for the supplementation of Kohlberg’s 
stage theory with an ontogenetic account of affective concern for others. As a way 
of conceptualizing this affective supplement in a way consistent with Kohlberg’s 
cognitivism, he suggests a combination of Martin Hoffman’s development theory 
of altruism with Peevers’ and Secord’s theory of personal understanding (Peters, 
1978, pp. 119-21).
3 There are, of course, other contributory factors. Both internal conditions, psychological 
as well as biological, and external social conditions have a marked influence on moral develop-
ment. See Peters, 1973, pp. 38-41.
r.s. pEtErs’ comprEhEnsivE thEory of moral Education 
kultura pedagogiczna 1/2014
21
According to Peters, moral education comprises the education both of reason 
and compassion, rational principles as well as the moral sentiments:
… moral education is centrally concerned with the development of certain types of 
motives, especially what I have called the rational passions. When looked at in a  justi-
ficatory context, some of these, e.g. benevolence, respect for persons and the sense of 
justice, function as fundamental principles. But if such principles are to be operative in 
a person’s conduct, they must become his principles. That means that they must come to 
function as motives, as considerations of a far-ranging sort that actually move him to act. 
(Peters, 1970, p. 75)
Without a sense of justice, the principle of justice stays inert. Without bene-
volence, the principle of the impartial consideration of interest remains external. 
To get children ‘inside’ the form of morality, we need the moral motivation of, 
what Peters calls, ‘the rational passions’. By themselves principles and rules – 
‘artificial’ and highly specific virtues – are inert or external in that they lack 
built-in reasons for action, whereas motives – ‘natural’ virtues – have reasons for 
action built into them and, accordingly, they lead a person all the way to action. 
In their connection to motives, moral principles are not affectively neutral and, 
thus connected, provide the moral motivation for authentic action.
8. morality’s content and habituation
Kohlberg’s stage theory is first and foremost a psychological theory about 
the form of morality, not about its content and, correspondingly, a theory about 
moral development, not about moral learning and teaching. Kohlberg does not 
occupy himself with the teaching and learning of ‘a bag of virtues’, but with the 
ontogenetic development of a principled morality. Peters admits that ‘the level of 
conception [of principles and rules]’, especially the conventional or postconven-
tional level, ‘determines both the type of content that can be assimilated and the 
aids which are available for this assimilation’ (Peters, 1973, p. 35). However, as 
against Kohlberg, Peters argues for the strong claim that the learning by habitua- 
tion of morality’s content – a code-encased morality – is logically and practically 
necessary for the development of morality’s form.4 Although habituation is, thus, 
necessary, it is not sufficient for moral development.
4 Peters also argues separately for the weak claim that the interactionistic development of 
the form of morality is compatible with the behaviouristic learning of the content of morality by 
means of habit-formation. For an evaluation of this claim, see Cuypers, 2009.
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Before I start expounding this claim, it is important to see why Peters defends 
it. This can be understood against the backdrop of Peters’ general view on the 
concept of education. On his account, education is an initiation into different 
modes of experience and knowledge, among which worthwhile activities and 
modes of conduct (Peters, 1963, p. 102-10). This amounts to an initiation into 
a  shared inheritance and public traditions (Peters, 1974b, p. 423-24). Of vital 
importance in the educational transmission are the impersonal content and pro-
cedures which are enshrined in this traditional heritage. In the light of Peters’ 
ethical pluralism, initiation into concrete worthwhile activities and specific codes 
of conduct is part and parcel of moral education: ‘In this more specific sense 
of education, …, all education is, therefore, moral education, …’ (Peters, 1970, 
p. 73). Initiating children into morality’s content is, therefore, essential for their 
moral education. They cannot simply develop the form of morality and work out 
its content for themselves. Educating children into the form of morality without 
its content is empty.
The way in which children conceive of moral rules determines without 
a doubt what they can assimilate of the moral life and how they can assimilate it. 
There are crucial differences between the (Kohlbergian) conventional and post-
conventional levels as to the place of learning morality’s content and the role of 
teaching methods at each level. I already commented on Kohlberg’s claims that 
virtue cannot be taught, though it can be cognitively stimulated and that learning 
a  principle is not the same as learning an explicit content. These claims are 
primarily made in the light of the postconventional or autonomous level of moral 
development. At the conventional or heteronomous level, children’s conception 
of moral rules is, however, conformity-based and authority-based. Such a conven-
tional form of thought correlates not only with the initiation into a code-encased 
morality but also with the fact that its specific content is learned by imitation 
and identification as well as by a behaviouristic process of operant conditioning, 
primarily by positive and negative reinforcement. At this level of ‘good boy’ or 
‘nice girl’ morality, concrete moral content and specific moral codes are instilled 
in children by means of habit-formation or habituation.5
5 Since Peters holds that the instilment of morality’s content in the conventional stages 
is essential for the moral life and, as a matter of historical and social fact, moral development 
beyond these stages is rather an exceptional phenomenon, his supplementation of Kohlberg’s 
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As against Kohlberg’s neglect of the importance of inculcating highly specific 
virtues and role-responsibilities in children, Peters makes the strong claim that 
the learning of morality’s content – a code-encased morality – is logically and 
practically necessary for the development of morality’s form. Given that children 
at the conventional level cannot adequately grasp moral rules, the learning of 
a  moral code cannot proceed by means of instruction and explanation. Since 
young children cannot see the rationale of moral principles, they are impervious 
to concept-clarification and reason-giving. If, at the conventional level, cogni- 
tive moral learning is impossible, then only behavioural moral learning or moral 
habit-formation seems to be possible as a path to post-conventional moral under-
standing. At the conventional level, educators have to resort to habit-training by 
means of behaviouristic reinforcement. Peters loosely connects the Aristotelian 
idea of moral education by habituation with the Skinnerian idea of moral training 
by operant conditioning. Although Peters is not a Skinnerian, and even criticizes 
behaviourism, he recognizes the value of the behaviouristic insight that there is no 
other way to meaningfully implant moral rules in young children except as backed 
up by reward or punishment, praise or blame (Peters, 1978, p. 125). Consequent- 
ly, the educational environment in the moral development of children functions, 
according to Peters, not only as a contributory cause, in line with Kohlberg’s con-
structivism, but also as a constitutive cause, in accord with social-learning theory.
Why is learning a code of conduct by habituation so important? (Peters, 1973, 
pp. 58-60; 1974a pp. 560-61; 1978, pp. 123-24). Learning morality’s content is 
logically necessary for the development of morality’s form for two reasons. First, 
without such learning a direct development from the egocentric attitude towards 
moral rules at the preconventional level to the autonomous attitude towards 
them at the postconventional level would be impossible. The postconventional, 
rationally reflective attitude towards rules presupposes the normative conception 
of a rule as based on conformity and authority. Children acquire this necessary 
basis to reflect on the validity of rules by picking up and internalizing specific 
rules of a code-encased morality. How could a child come to follow a rule auto-
nomously, if it had not learnt – in, what Piaget calls, the ‘transcendental’ stage of 
moral realism – what it is to follow a rule as a rule? The child needs to conceive 
stage theory faces the charges of ‘second-handedness’ and indoctrination. For an account of 
Peters’ response to this criticism, see again Cuypers, 2009.
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of a rule as something authoritative and not just as something one egocentrically 
complies with in order to avoid punishment or to get rewards.
Secondly, the exertion of morality’s form by applying moral principles would 
be inconceivable without morality’s content. Abstract principles could not func-
tion without concrete content. What moral principles such as justice and the 
consideration of interests mean is only intelligible in relation to highly specific 
virtues (like that of honesty), role-responsibilities (like those of being a parent) 
and other specific normative notions (like that of need). In other words, 
Kohlberg’s thinking about principles is top-down, whereas Peters’ is bottom-up. 
This bottom-up approach to principles allows for the immanent presence of them 
in social practices and roles. Moral principles only come explicitly into play when 
the justification or criticism of some determinate moral content at the lower- 
level is in order; they are only appealed to in cases of moral conflict and un- 
certainty at the ground floor of the moral life.
Moreover, learning morality’s content is practically (or instrumentally) 
necessary for the development of morality’s form for two reasons. First, peaceful 
social life would degenerate to the state of nature where ‘the life of man, [is] 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutisch, and short’ (Hobbes, 1651, part I, chap. 13), if 
children as well as adults were not to observe a basic code of conduct. Given that 
only a  very small minority of the population reaches the autonomous level of 
principled morality, it is vital that the vast majority follows the basic moral rules 
such as contract-keeping and property-preserving.
Secondly, the moral life would be psychologically exhausting if on all occa-
sions we had to rationally reflect upon the validity of moral principles and rules 
before making decisions and acting accordingly. In order to avoid moral paralysis, 
it is essential that we can rely on the direct operation of a  fair stock of moral 
habits, among which highly specific virtues, internalized basic rules and role- 
responsibilities.
If the learning of morality’s content is necessary for the development of 
morality’s form, then the adoption of the learning method of habituation, 
assisted by Aristotelian-Skinnerian teaching devices, seems inevitable: ‘Virtue, 
then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main 
owes its birth and its growth to teaching …, while moral virtue comes about 
as a result of habit, …’ (Aristotle, 2009, 1103a, 14-17). Aristotle contrasts here 
teaching by explicit instruction as the method for the intellectual virtues, such as 
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scientific knowledge and theoretical wisdom, with teaching by habit-formation 
as the one for the moral virtues.6 What exactly is habituation? Aristotle gives the 
canonical formulation of this concept:
… , it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced 
and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and 
bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and 
of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. … 
This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our trans-
actions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in 
the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become 
brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become 
temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one 
way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character 
arise out of like activities. (Aristotle, 2009, 1103b, 7-26)
Repetitious activity, in the sense of going through the same motions many 
times, produces settled dispositions or habits, good and bad. One acquires 
virtues (or vices) by repeatedly doing virtuous (or vicious) acts in appropriate 
circumstances.
In line with this account of habituation, Peters (1971, pp. 250; 255) delivers 
the following conceptual analysis: In the moral education of children habituation 
is a learning process in which they familiarize themselves with and repeat certain 
action patterns so that specific dispositions to act get instilled. This process 
might, but need not involve, drill. During habit-training the action patterns are 
stabilized by means of behaviouristic reinforcement in terms of reward or punish-
ment, praise or blame. Once inculcated, habits meet two conditions in particular: 
they are characterized by a settled dispositional structure which implies (a) repeti- 
tion in the future and (b) a certain automatism in routine situations. Since one 
does not have to rationally reflect and deliberately take decisions about habitual 
action, one can habitually act more or less automatically. Yet on a  particular 
occasion, mostly when routine breaks down, one may review one’s habits and, for 
example, resolve against them.
According to Peters, learning morality’s content by habituation is necessary, 
but not sufficient for the development of the moral life for three reasons (ibid., 
1971, pp. 251-53). First, and this is an immediate consequence of Peters’ ethical 
6 Compare this with the unrestricted concept of teaching, introduced in section 6.
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pluralism, the different aspects of our moral life relate differently to habit-forma-
tion. The method of habituation works well in the cases of learning highly specific 
virtues, internalizing basic rules and adopting role-responsibilities. However, 
in the cases of learning principles, strengthening motivations and exercising 
will-qualities the effect of this method is very limited, or at most only indirect. 
As I  already explained, learning a  moral principle is not the same as learning 
explicit moral content. To grasp a moral principle, for instance that of the impar-
tial consideration of interests, a child needs to grasp the presupposed concepts, 
such as that of ‘interest’, and the development of these cognitive prerequisites 
seems inconceivable on the basis of some process of behavioural conditioning 
alone. Moreover, the open-endedness involved in the application of principles 
is orthogonal with the condition of repetition in the future for habitual action. 
As to the other moral aspects, the process of habit-formation cannot directly 
reach both strengthening motivations, which depend on the arousal of emotions, 
and exercising will-qualities, which presuppose the presence of counterinclina-
tions. The active participation of the mind in motivation and will-power goes 
against the condition of automatism in habituation.
Secondly, in non-routine situations habits can no longer serve as guides 
for conducting a  moral life. In addition, when the reinforcing sanctions are 
withdrawn, there is no guarantee that habits will remain operative in controlling 
behaviour. As soon as one cannot rely anymore on the automatism of habitual 
dispositions, other considerations have to come in to guide the decisions and 
actions taken in the moral life.
Thirdly, and connectedly, moral habits have an essential incompleteness 
about them in that they exclusively operate on extrinsic reasons. Highly specific 
virtues, basic rules and role-responsibilities lack built-in reasons for action. Given 
that intrinsic reasons are absent, they strongly depend on contextual factors, 
such as the presence of reinforcing sanctions, for their continuation.
Exactly these two latter points constitute the kernel of Kohlberg’s criticism 
that ‘a bag of virtues’ is situation-specific, short-term and reversible. This critique 
does, however, no damage to Peters’ strong claim that the learning of a code- 
encased morality by habituation is (indeed) not sufficient but only necessary for 
the development of the moral life.7
7 An extended version of this paper appeared as chapter 6 in Cuypers and Martin, 2013.
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